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[6.0] ENTRY POINTS: CONTINUITIES AND DISRUPTIONS
[6.1] Deliberations on the day-to-day running of the Internet that once took place
in venues far removed from the public eye, presided over by technical and
legal experts, now make the headline news around the world.1 The amount of
media attention currently being given to decisions about the Internet’s de-
sign, access, and use is at a level unforeseen by those individuals and groups
working to make what used to be referred to as global media policy agendas
and that now go under the name of Internet governance more socioculturally
inclusive and politically accountable. But it is only since 2013 when Edward
Snowden, former contractor with the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA),
leaked evidence of unlawful forms of mass online surveillance at the behest
of the U.S., UK, and other governments that policy making at the nexus of
human rights and the Internet have taken center stage.2 These revelations and
their political fallout around the world have provided an important impetus to
efforts, from civil society as well as some intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), to see Internet policy making more consciously framed within inter-
national human rights law and norms.3
[6.2] What this shift from behind the scenes to front of house means is that
socioculturally inflected priorities for Internet policy making are now part of
the agendas that have been largely framed by the technical and economic
priorities of computer engineers and Internet businesses. Nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), grassroots groups, and other sorts of civil society
organizations (CSOs), or hybrid advocacy networks, have also been making
their voices heard in settings dominated by a constellation of intergovern-
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mental and quasi-nongovernmental bodies primarily concerned with the
technical or legal dimensions of the Internet as an economic undertaking.
This shift to more diverse participation and topics on the agenda has been
taking place over the last decade in particular. Nonetheless the view that
decisions about the Internet’s design, access, and use are primarily technical
questions, and thereby socially and politically neutral, remains strong
amongst those communities of engineers and computer programmers who
have been at the forefront of the Internet’s development.4 Once a narrow
term for these informal networks of experts and technical decision making
based predominately in the United States, the term Internet governance now
covers the full spectrum of activities pertaining to how the Internet works; at
the level of national legislatures, there are UN agencies such as the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union (ITU) and UNESCO, and other sorts of
standards-making bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF).5 An added factor in this diversifying landscape of Internet-govern-
ance processes, and actors looking to steer these outcomes, is the incumbent
power of corporations that own and control the lion’s share of the Internet’s
current configuration of “Web 2.0” generation of social media products and
services.6
[6.3]The increasingly proactive role of governments and the UN in promoting
Internet governance as an international, and thereby geopolitical, undertaking
collides in many respects with this way of doing business, based on the
assumption that the Internet owes its existence to neoliberal, free market
economics premised on minimal state intervention. Whilst others argue the
converse, that the Internet owes its existence to government, research, and
military funding, the arrival of civil society activists across the spectrum of
Internet-governance venues underscores how these once expert-led and rela-
tively inaccessible arenas for laypersons are now populated by technically
and politically savvy participants looking to influence the terms of reference
for a range of agendas. Civil society organizations and affiliated networks
have become more organized, apparently better funded, and more visible in
these intergovernmental and business-led settings.7 The role and historical
influence of civil society as a stakeholder of circumstance, as arbiter or co-
accomplice in current and future decision-making, is a source of intense
debate within these networks, fueling in turn scholarly debates about the
past, present, and future of Internet governance as an implicitly inclusive and
participatory rather than a predominately intergovernmental process.8
[6.4]Meanwhile the historical heartlands of the Internet—as an idea, way of
life, and business—the United States first and foremost but also western
Europe, face stiff competition from other contenders in setting the inter-
governmental, that is, global, agenda for the future of the Internet’s design,
access, and use. Whilst these UN member states variously stake their claims
on the agenda as primarily a matter of national sovereignty, day-to-day deci-
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sions about the regulation of online content for commercial services such as
Facebook or Twitter pay less heed to national boundaries. In addition, the
incumbent powers in setting the agenda based in the United States, UK, and
western Europe are facing increasing competition from major economies
based in the Global South, namely, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa (the so-called BRICS countries). These shifts were already in place
before the events of 2013, the aforementioned “Snowden revelations” of
mass surveillance online, saw human rights considerations come to the fore
and so emerge as a “wild card into the mix” of Internet-governance geopoli-
tics according to some observers.9
[6.5] In short, Internet governance is being increasingly regarded as an interna-
tional human rights affair.10 How—and when—this shift took place is be-
yond the means of this chapter.11 Suffice it to say that debates over the
human rights implications for Internet design, access, and use now encapsu-
late Internet governance and its discontents at this historical juncture. This
shift in the form and substance of policy agendas, for human rights and other
issues around cyberveillance,12 has also accentuated a number of ongoing
and emergent issues about the constitution of Internet governance in terms of
main actors and processes: for example, who rings any changes in how the
Internet is run through, say, decisions made at ICANN meetings around the
world on Internet domain names and addresses,13 or standards-making or-
ganizations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as
their work straddles transnational and national jurisdictions at cross-sector
and cross-border events that are variously open to “stakeholders.”14 This
means that Internet governance, as it is currently construed and practiced as
both process and outcome, challenges technocentric, state-centric and busi-
ness-centric models for running the Internet simultaneously.15 In this respect
the involvement of civil society organizations has raised its own set of ques-
tions about accountability as these nonstate actors challenge, or affirm, ongo-
ing “public-private partnerships” between government and business to roll
out Internet access on a global level or provide content and other online
services.16
[6.6] CHAPTER RATIONALE
[6.7] By now it should be apparent that the term Internet governance is the object
of some debate as well as a set of hotly contested processes between diverse
interests that both compete and cooperate with one another. This also means
that like the history of the Internet itself, that of Internet governance is still
being written. This chapter aims to pinpoint some of the most pressing issues
that preoccupy the multisited (i.e., online and/or off line) cross-sector spaces
in which agendas are set and decisions taken. It is a discussion that comes
Marianne I. Franklin DRAFT
from a particular point of view, namely, that of longstanding participant-
observation research into the Internet-politics-society nexus and more recent-
ly direct involvement in human rights advocacy in some of these venues and
processes from an engaged critical scholarly and lay perspective. 17
[6.8]First I provide some historical and definitional orientation points, in order
to help the reader navigate the dizzying array of possible topics that jostle for
attention for any discussion of Internet policy making. After a brief look at
two milestones in the establishment of Internet governance as a global under-
taking, we move to the participatory and conceptual issues that constitute
different visions of Internet governance and the dynamics of agenda setting
that fall under this rubric. For heuristic purposes, I will discuss these meta-
level concerns in light of debates around where Internet governance takes
place—or is seen to be taking place—how it is organized (as a conscious
strategy, by convention, or in response to mobilization), and who gets to take
part. This approach may seem counterintuitive in that identifying key issues
usually starts with articulating these in substantive terms. But as Internet
governance as a term takes leave of its once-narrow, engineering, and prob-
lem-solving definition and as its closed-shop, technophile, and expert-led
venues go global, this undertaking becomes in itself an issue of some magni-
tude.18
[6.9]Decisions, and intense debates about who gets to call the shots that have
been taking place behind the scenes, at the “back end” of the Internet’s daily
operations,19 have direct and indirect consequences for how individuals and
communities are able to access and use the Internet of the day. As the human
rights–Internet nexus shows, claims that Internet governance is primarily a
technical problem-solving exercise, disconnected from the immediate or
wider socioeconomic or political context in which said problem arises, no
longer holds sway. For example, changes in the “privacy settings” of major
service providers such as Facebook and Google in recent years have high-
lighted that the repercussions for how millions of people socialize, maintain
family relationships, or get their work done go far beyond the technical
parameters of software “upgrades.”20
[6.10]NAVIGATING HISTORICAL, DEFINITIONAL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL TERRAINS
[6.11]This chapter started with problematizing rather than defining Internet
governance. However, a working definition does exist, a much-cited albeit
circular articulation of this process. Established during the UN-brokered
World Summit on the Information Society, or WSIS (2003–2005), that
ushered in Internet policy making as an intergovernmental undertaking, the
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Working Group on Internet Governance set up as part of these meetings
concluded that the term denoted
[6.12] the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-
making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the
Internet. . . . This working definition reinforces the concept of inclusiveness of
Governments, the private sector and civil society in the mechanisms of Inter-
net governance.21
[6.13] It would not be exaggerating to note that a decade on, nearly every term in
this working definition continues to be hotly contested; also debated is the
extent of these “respective roles” in legal and technical terms, technological
and commercial changes to the Internet since this working group’s delibera-
tions, which principles or norms are shared and by whom and in a so-called
post-Snowden context, and who is responsible for restoring “trust” in this
very model of governance.
[6.14] To grasp the intensity of these ensuing debates, we need to move past this
rather functionalist definition however. For the purposes of this discussion,
let me offer an additional conceptualization. Namely, Internet governance
can be taken as a rubric for a set of techno-economically and techno-soci-
oculturally constituted political processes that concern ownership and control
of a planetary constellation of information and communication technologies
(the Internet in short) and corollary service provisions that have transformed
regulatory and conceptual conventions that separate pre-Internet media and
telecommunications from computer-mediated ones. The way people, states
and businesses use the Internet in turn is in the process of transforming
conventional understandings of national jurisdiction, sovereignty and with
that the constitution of multilateral institutions such as the UN as ipso facto
intergovernmental organizations.22
[6.15] Getting to grips with struggles over the form and substance of global
Internet governance at this historical juncture also means tackling those
around the impact of Internet-dependent media and communications on “tra-
ditional” broadcasting and print media on the one hand and, on the other,
telecommunications. In this respect the Internet, broadly defined, emerges in
the scholarly and policy literature in various ways, for example, construed as
“new media.”23 In practical terms, the converging of traditional media sec-
tors with computing and Internet communications has had major repercus-
sions for longstanding administrative and disciplinary separations between
media policy and law on the one hand and, on the other, Internet policy and
law.24 Moreover, the Internet, and struggles over how it has been governed,
alongside shifts in debates about how it should be governed, concerns a
particular historical conjuncture of predominately computer-dependent
modes of communication, knowledge exchange, human association, and
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sociopolitical organization that are now being put in place by design as much
as they are unintended consequences.25
[6.16]The terms of access and use and then the content that is produced online
and then circulated as not only substantive material (words, images, and
sounds) but also statistics of use, known as metadata management (the stor-
age and use of digital information about where and how people, users, access
the Internet as they produce both traffic and content), are important distinc-
tions under the common use of the term the Internet. This has become a
catchall term for what are planetary computerized communications with
quite local, personalized characteristics that indicate who and what individu-
al users are doing whilst they are online, and how and when they are online.
All these data accrue though the ability of software applications to track,
store, and process these burgeoning databases of our “digital imagination,”26
without which the Internet as a globally distributed “thinking machine”27 and
imaginary would not be thinkable. From the World Wide Web applications
that arguably turned the Internet from a computer geek tool to a mass me-
dium and to the Google (search engine and allied services such as YouTube)
dominance of how people surf/search the web and the social-networking
tools such as Facebook (and allied mobile services such as WhatsApp), there
is an intimate albeit noncontingent interrelationship between its physical and
digital design and ways the people use its products and services. The shift in
terminology from “the Internet” to “the World Wide Web” and to “social
media” belies the fact that today’s Internet still runs on early generations of
software codes, computer communications protocols, and the physical (cable
and satellite) networks that link computers with each other across a room, a
floor, and now around the world. Whether or not it is written with a capital I
or not, the Internet is much more than the sum of its parts, made up of
software and hardware combinations that straddle the microscopic and the
planetary. However defined, the Internet has well and truly left the ivory
towers of its early years and has become the “mass media” of the early
twenty-first century.28
[6.17]As to where formalized processes of Internet-governance decisions take
place when not occurring within national borders and legal jurisdictions,
there are a number of organizations and corollary venues engaged. Some are
part of emerging “multistakeholder” institutions, such as the Internet
Governance Forum, whilst other venues are based at older UN agencies in
the process of reinventing themselves as custodians of the Internet as a global
or public good to varying degrees, such as UNESCO. Intergovernmental
bodies such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
UNESCO, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
or the newest UN venue, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), have divided
their “roles and responsibilities” along the aforementioned divide between
the technical, sociocultural, and legal dimensions to agenda setting for the
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Internet at the international level. For instance, ITU works with treaty-mak-
ing powers; UNESCO has been charged with a caretaker role of education,
development, and freedom of expression; and IGF is premised on being the
UN host for consultations that aim to “build global consensus”29 around the
panoply of issues laid out in the Declarations of Principles and Action Plans
of preceding UN initiatives.30
[6.18] As more explicitly sociocultural agendas for running the Internet gather
momentum, those focusing on human rights–based frameworks in particular,
we can see how Internet governance has become a term and a locus for a
range of competing visions for the future design, access, and use of the
Internet for different interests. This pits supporters of pre-Internet notions of
national sovereignty and corollary legal jurisdictions against the real-time
power of corporate service providers and their copyright powers.
[6.19] RECENT MILESTONES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
[6.20] To recall, public awareness and rise in the political and economic stakes of
questions around who does, or should, run the Internet took off in 2013 and
in the wake of the Internet’s role in social unrest and political mobilization in
recent years. These major events have unfurled alongside successive waves
of furore over commercial service providers’ overreaches (e.g., by tracking
and archiving of metadata through implicit rather than fully informed con-
sent). Given the impetus provided by the Snowden revelations, it may seem
surprising to hear that human rights for the Internet continue to be a con-
tested priority for Internet-governance consultations within technical com-
munities as well as governmental sectors. In the case of rights-based policy
agendas for the online environment, how to implement human rights norms,
in the relative absence of case law to draw from,31 and the centrifugal forces
of national jurisdiction that pull away from fully fledged global governance
institutions are debates that take place in a number of competing venues.
These forces are evident within longstanding Internet-governance (IG) or-
ganizations such as ICANN, as opponents of national, government-led pro-
cesses vie with UN agencies for precedence in setting both the agenda and
the terms of reference at any given moment. Within this intense reshuffle of
intergovernmental and international advocacy priorities and intensifying
scholarly debates are those engaged in a range of human rights mobilization
for agenda setting around Internet design, access, and use. Here the last few
years have seen some substantial progress in the form of official, that is,
intergovernmental, recognition that international human rights law and
norms and Internet-governance agendas are mutually dependent.
[6.21] Two events at the international level stand out in this regard. Their histor-
ical legacy is at time of writing still moot, but the intention of both initiatives
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provide two signposts for the future of Internet-governance institutions. First,
as noted above, is high-level, intergovernmental recognition of human rights
as a foundational, not just an add-on, element to how the Internet should be
governed, Second is the official, that is, ostensible, recognition from major
intergovernmental bodies such as ITU or UNESCO that Internet governance
is also an inherently multistakeholder enterprise (more on this term below).
The first milestone in this regard is the UN Human Rights Council Resolu-
tion of 2012.32 Entitled “The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Hu-
man Rights on the Internet,” this resolution encapsulates efforts that both
preceded and benefitted from the Snowden revelations of mass online sur-
veillance in 2013 on behalf of putting human rights frameworks for the
Internet on the agenda at the highest echelons of UN Human Rights agencies.
Resolution A/HRC/RES/20/8
[6.22]1. Affirms that the same rights that people have offline must also be
protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is appli-
cable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice, in
accordance with articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
[6.23]2. Recognizes the global and open nature of the Internet as a driving
force in accelerating progress towards development in its various
forms;
[6.24]3. Calls upon all States to promote and facilitate access to the Internet
and international cooperation aimed at the development of media and
information and communications facilities in all countries.”33
[6.25]This resolution seals the commitment, in principle at least and in the most
general of language, of those signatories to the premise that the online envi-
ronment also falls under the international human rights law and norms. The
ethical and legal issue that arises, however, is that these same states as
custodians and generators of human rights under the UN system are also
perpetrators of human rights abuses, again online and on the ground.34 This
conflict of interests affects moves by government agencies to prioritize state
actors in the Internet-governance domain given their “roles and responsibil-
ities” in enforcing human rights off line and ipso facto online according to
international law.
[6.26]A second milestone of another sort was the inaugural NETmundial, co-
hosted by the Brazilian government and ICANN in April 2014, in São Paulo,
Brazil. The outcome of this meeting was the finalization of a draft statement
entitled the “NETmundial Multistakeholder Outcome Document.”35 Whilst
some of the wording in the final text remains hotly debated amongst civil
society participants active in these negotiations, 36 two substantive aspects
bear mentioning in terms of what they suggest about how prominent actors
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engaged in molding the “global Internet-governance” agenda see the future.
Cohosts of this meeting, Brazil and ICANN, count as key actors in this
regard. First, in stronger terms than the UN 2012 Resolution discussed
above, this Outcome Document underscores the formative, not simply corol-
lary, role that international human rights law and norms have in this state-
ment’s articulation of a “set of common principles and important values” that
“should underpin Internet governance principles.”37 The second aspect is the
prominent place given to nonstate actors as playing a potentially equal role in
decision making on Internet design, access, and use. A third point of note is
the claim in the statement preamble that this meeting was “a bottom-up,
open, and participatory process involving thousands of people from govern-
ments, private sector, civil society, technical community, and academia from
around the world . . . the first of its kind.”38
[6.27] The provenance, organization, and eventual outcome of this meeting, one
that took place outside the auspices of the UN’s Internet Governance Forum
and other UN agencies looking to set the agenda (UNESCO and ITU being
two cases in point), deserves its own treatment.39 Moreover fuller research
into the power dynamics that became evident in the decisions taken in pre-
paring for this event, and those emerging since participants at the conference
agreed to this version as a “nonbinding” undertaking,40 has yet to emerge.
The point I want to make on going to press is that the future of the 2014
NETmundial participatory model as a serious contender to the one pioneered
at the UN Internet Governance Forum is a moot point.41 That said, so is the
future of the IGF itself as its continued existence is up for renewal at the UN
WSIS+10 meeting in New York, in December 2015.
[6.28] It bears repeating that the first of these milestones was passed before the
Snowden revelations of 2013. Whilst debates continue, ongoing revelations
are revealed of governmental surveillance tools that have been deployed
online or deep within the Internet’s operational infrastructure without the
knowledge let alone full consent of ordinary Internet users, and with the legal
compliance of Internet companies; this is the first UN resolution that ad-
dresses the Internet and human rights together. Critics note that high-level
resolutions such as these, for all their symbolic power, only scratch the
surface. They are far removed from the techno-legal and political practical-
ities of bringing human rights law and norms to bear on the complex, dense
policy domain that encompasses both formal and informal decision making
about how the Internet is run, or should be run, on the one hand and, on the
other, on how people interact, present themselves, and produce content in
public and private “cyberspaces.”42 These issues around implementation
(how exactly) and the lack of feasible or affordable legal remedies remain
unaddressed. However this first UN acknowledgment that human rights ap-
ply to the online environment is now public record, even if its substantive
contribution to the implementation of human rights frameworks across the
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spectrum of Internet-governance agendas is unclear.43 It thereby takes its
place as part of the long trail of discourses and undertakings that the UN
system as a whole and its respective agencies develop as they “frame the
world,”44 in this case in response to “increasing public concern at the nation-
al and international levels about the protection and enjoyment of human
rights online as well as offline.”45
[6.29]For this reason, understanding how key issues divide and unite actors
engaging across the spectrum of Internet governance as an emergent set of
institutions can be divided into two streams: (1) those who take these pro-
cesses to be a particular sort of inclusive process that sets out to achieve so-
called concrete outcomes, and (2) those who focus on steering the discursive,
policy-framing, and agenda-setting dimensions to these gatherings. Whether
an IT engineer or IT lawyer, politician or career diplomat, or hactivist/activist
or Internet policy director of an international NGO or think tank, both dimen-
sions are increasingly important to balance; it is essential to engage in deci-
sions that generate outcomes—policy and official undertakings—whether or
not these are legally binding, and intervene in the narrative, larger and specif-
ic to any given issue area (e.g., net neutrality, cyberveillance).
[6.30]RECURRING CONCEPTUAL AND PARTICIPATORY
CONUNDRUMS
[6.31]There is a paradox at the heart of the term Internet governance in that it
implies the Internet needs governing at all, that is, formal forms of political
oversight that go beyond the informal, expert-run networks responsible for
upgrading and maintaining the software codes on the one hand and, on the
other, the physical, computer-mediated communications networks compris-
ing successive generations of the Internet’s design, access, and use. The
aforementioned official definition of Internet governance states, despite evi-
dence to the contrary, that there is a “common understanding of the Internet,”
whilst “there is not yet a shared view of Internet governance.”46 The latter
differences mark out significant differentials in political and legal power over
how decisions are taken, who takes those decisions, and on whose behalf.47
[6.32]For instance, when it comes to participation in agenda setting, if not
decision making, the remit of the Internet Governance Forum, called into
being at the 2005 Tunis Summit of the World Summit on the Information
Society, explicitly notes that this is to be a “forum for multistakeholder
policy dialogue M that isM multilateral, multistakeholder, democratic and
transparent.”48 The term “multistakeholder” has become increasingly politi-
cized in Internet-governance deliberations and agenda setting for the future.
For some, this term denotes an emergent form of global democracy whereby
governments can be called to account for policy decisions that impact how
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the Internet works or is used. For others the same term is a euphemism for
legitimating corporate ownership and control of Internet-dependent public
services.49 On this point government representatives differ as well, for such
differences of policy and working principles are also differences in political
ideology and worldview.
[6.33] The other term—multilateralism—which once designated intergovern-
mental initiatives, or undertakings dependent upon governments’ role in law-
making (such as human rights), has become positioned as the polar opposite
of multistakeholderism, for better or for worse and, again, depending on the
point of view. However, as the Tunis agenda cited above shows, the histori-
cal record confirms that both terms have their place in these “founding docu-
ments” of the UN’s establishment of the Internet Governance Forum as a
place where member states are one rather than the only constituency. Schol-
ars and activists will continue to wrangle over these two terms for some time
to come because, when it comes to human rights, as a legal obligation of UN
member states to protect citizens under international law, and businesses to
respect these laws when providing goods and services, the tripartite issues of
accountability, access to legal remedy (promised but yet to be delivered in
web-saturated settings), and enforcement remain under-elucidated areas for
consideration and action.
[6.34] Whilst conceptualizing the “Internet” and its governance according to
these contested criteria of participation and decision-making responsibilities
continues to be grist to the mill for debates, those for whom these struggles
are taking place point to the next issue around participation, namely, the one-
third of the world’s population who are not yet online and who are positioned
as either an inferior state of nonconnectivity or aspiring to go online. “Con-
necting the next billion”50 is a catchphrase based in the very last of the UN
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in which the UN undertakes in
“cooperation with the private sector, [to] make available benefits of new
technologies, especially information and communications” to the Global
South.51
[6.35] This project to connect the whole world has been reiterated in the last
decade of Internet-governance events at the international level, the NETmun-
dial included.52 But as critics—including from the Global South—note, this
emphasis on information and communication technologies (ICT), viz. the
Internet, as a hi-tech solution for endemic socioeconomic equalities within
the Global South as well as between Internet-“rich” and Internet-“poor” parts
of the Global North, begs the question of the troubled historical legacy of
international development programs that lean heavily on technological solu-
tions.53 In a year in which the UN Millennium Development Goals are being
reviewed fifteen years later, the 1995 UN Beijing Conference on the Status
of Women is twenty years on, and the World Summit on the Information
Society undergoes its ten-year review, and with the future of the Internet
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Governance Forum itself up for renewal, a range of issues queue up to be
taken into consideration, for example, around sustainable development, gen-
der rights, access for persons with disability and young people, and increas-
ingly the environmental costs of the electricity-dependent Internet servers
and use of nonrenewable resources in the construction of computers and
other hardware components. At the heart of these debates, about the viability
of multilateral versus multistakeholder models for Internet-governance deci-
sion-making processes on the one hand and, on the other, the efficacy of
Western, hi-tech modernization imperatives that position the Internet as the
answer to global poverty, gender inequalities, and all other social injustices,
is the role of governments—or to put it another way, the role of the private
sector in providing essential goods and services, of which Internet access is
now considered primary.
[6.36]In the meantime, Internet-dependent societies have become mobilized by
the human rights implications of both government-sponsored and commer-
cially facilitated forms of mass surveillance and data mining. Internet for
Development priorities, referred to as ICT for Development (ICT4D), and its
environmental costs, still have some way to go. As such, these issues within
or distinct from human rights frameworks for the Internet54 call upon, indeed
require, by international law the active rather than the passive role of govern-
ments in setting the rules, enforcing them, and being accountable. They also
imply the cooperation of the same governments at the highest level about the
key terms of reference of human rights and the Internet in practical terms, on
content regulation and terms of use, for instance. And here, as is the case
within civil society, intense disagreement is the rule. Moreover, there are
powerful lobbies—involving those involved in the earlier prototypes of Inter-
net technologies and the online communities that emerged in the Internet’s
earliest iterations as part of the U.S. West Coast IT-enthusiast countercul-
tures in the 1980s—that would disagree with any need for regulation apart
from technical maintenance. When the adjective “global” is included in the
mix, particularly in the context of UN-hosted consultations, this paradox
becomes a geopolitical bone of contention, not just a technical problem to
solve.
[6.37]This brings us to how participation is linked to location, for the term
“global Internet governance” posits a process, a venue, and a constituency
that operates in ways that are neither reducible nor confined to national
institutions, jurisdictions, or citizenries.55 Whilst national media and policy-
making models continue to operate within pre-Internet-age imaginaries, as
nation-based media discourses and electoral priorities, when it comes to
Internet governance state actors do not dominate. How the Internet is run has
meant a shift in venue, register, and forms of attendance. And these shifts
affect how any given Internet-governance issue is understood, conveyed, and
contested.
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[6.38] WHAT COUNTS AS A KEY ISSUE IS POLITICAL
[6.39] Before concluding let me link the above conundrums to the equally vexed
question of what counts as a key issue and who decides when it comes to
setting these agendas, for example, (1) how decisions that appear to be purely
technical, standard-setting face arguments that they have a role to play in the
skewed geographies of Internet access and use; (2) when public services are
pitted against for-profit business priorities in decisions where copyright law
is involved; or (3) the ongoing standoff between advocates of open-source
software and the proprietary software licenses of major corporate players
such as Microsoft or Apple. All of these areas have implications for how
people access the Internet and use the web as they produce, find, and then
share content online.
[6.40] Contentions about which issues are paramount and who decides on past,
present, and future decisions about the Internet’s design, access, and use have
played a constitutive rather than a mimetic role in the history of Internet
governance as a relatively new institutional process and, with that, an object
of scholarly analysis. Right from the outset, if we were to date the origins of
intergovernmental initiatives to institutionalize Internet governance in the
ITU-hosted WSIS in 2003–2005,56 we have seen in the official record de-
bates taking place behind the scenes about the terms and participatory param-
eters of agenda setting.57 In current Internet governance speak, the conven-
tional term for these different positions is “stakeholders,” according to three
broad categories: public (governmental), private (business), and civil society
(i.e., nongovernmental organizations).
[6.41] As noted above, the term that encapsulates the notion of Internet govern-
ance as an inclusive process of consultation if not decision making, rather
than one reserved for governmental representatives alone, is “multistake-
holder participation,”58 multistakeholderism for short. The way in which the
latter term has been positioned at the opposite end of the spectrum to multi-
lateralism is arguably one of the most contentious issues of Internet govern-
ance today—not just who can participate but also who gets to decide at the
end of the day who does take part and consequently who can be called to
account and by what means. With human rights now a clear fixture on the
agenda, the “roles and responsibilities” of UN member states under interna-
tional law to uphold and protect human rights as these arise online confront
the de facto rule of private Internet service providers on the one hand and, on
the other, claims by civil society organizations to be given more than a token
role in these proceedings.
[6.42] These debates, echoing precursor initiatives to forge an international con-
sensus on “global media policy,” highlight the different political stakes, tech-
no-economic resources, and worldviews of protagonists.59 Recall, there are
those who regard the Internet and its governance as primarily a techno-
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economic concern and confront those who privilege the sociocultural—hu-
man—dimensions to decisions about the design, access, and use of Internet
media and communications. These positions of relative influence (not the
same as relative visibility) highlight the extent to which dominant actors
work to shape the agenda with or without reference to a growing list of
concerns that are anchored in the later treaties and covenants of international
human rights law.60 Containing the Internet-governance agenda within a
strictly technical understanding is one way to keep out nontechnical concerns
that are nonetheless affected by the way people use the Internet and the way
power holders in turn deploy these technologies for various ends against
citizens (including residents at home and citizens abroad), in the name of
national security or public order, for instance. But these “power holders” who
are referred to in these official statements are no longer nation-states, both in
working practice and by volition. This means that a disconnect has opened
between wider publics, usually addressed as national citizenries or local
communities, and those agencies charged with Internet law and policy who
are not, by law, directly answerable to these publics. So here we see how
differing conceptualizations and models of democracy, or indeed any other
political system, are becoming articulated as intrinsically Internet-govern-
ance issues. Incumbent UN powerbrokers (e.g., the United States and other
permanent members of the Security Council) and voices from the Global
South, those states that have a vote in the UN but relatively little say on
setting the techno-economic agenda of current consultations, are particularly
alert to this nexus.61 A second point to note is that any decisions about an
issue, once identified as significant and then put on the agenda, have reper-
cussions for de jure (existing national and international legal mechanisms),
and de facto decision making about the Internet’s design, access, or use that
also implicates online content production. Stronger still, active parties and
analysts, like authors in this volume, have to take into account the recent sea
change in popular imaginaries about the uncomfortable interconnection be-
tween how ordinary people use the Internet in everyday life and the pressing
legal and ethical implications of how states and corporations have been de-
ploying the Internet in turn.62 Public attention being paid to human rights
online in recent years belies, however, awareness by successive U.S. admin-
istrations of the Internet’s economic implications and with that its political
and military dimensions.63
[6.43]This brings me to the third contentious issue: continuity and change in
technical and legal terms, in other words, how to distinguish between exist-
ing and emerging—new—areas for consideration given the relatively short
institutional history of “global Internet governance” consultations at the UN
level within longstanding institutions, and the legacy of precursor initiatives
to establish global agendas. This legacy is a contentious, indeed cantanker-
ous, one that reaches back into the 1970s.64 For one thing, the terms of
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reference have changed enormously, from “global media debates” to UN
Summits on the “Information Society,” and to “Internet Governance.”65 As
the historical narrative around the origins of the Internet remains open to
interpretation and contestation, so does that emerging around how the Inter-
net has been, will be, and indeed should be governed, if at all. There are two
dimensions to these debates and how they are articulated as agendas and
outcomes. The first continues to concern process and participation. The sec-
ond concerns substantive issues and outcomes in highly specialized areas that
exercise participants in different degrees and in different locations, for in-
stance, those advocating for the internationalization of ICANN.66 Another
example pivots on the technical specifications of national legislation on man-
datory filtering of online content, seen as censorship for some, protection of
minors for others.67 In the wake of the Snowden revelations, media coverage
of these measures pale in comparison though to those laws being put into
place, in the United States and the UK, for instance, that grant law enforce-
ment agencies increasing powers to track and collect users’ personal data
online in the name of national cybersecurity.68
[6.44] Fourth, there are those issues that explicitly link techno-legal, regulatory,
and sociocultural agendas under one rubric. Human rights frameworks that
can be applied at all points of the Internet’s governance are a principal
approach in this respect, the gaps between this broad and comprehensive set
of aspirations and their implementation in everyday decisions about running
the Internet notwithstanding.69 Whichever narrative holds sway within a re-
spective moment, meeting, or outcome relating to Internet governance as a
transborder undertaking, the thing to note is that whether they are couched in
engineering, legal, or political terms, these narratives evoke competing vi-
sions of Internet futures, namely, those pivoting on an Internet premised on
ongoing conventions of national sovereignty—territorially bordered citizen-
ries of “netizens” in the face of online and off-line worlds that are indelibly
shaped by substantial commercial ownership of the transborder, computer-
mediated encounters and transactions of Internet-dependent societies.
[6.45] IN CONCLUSION
[6.46] At least some procedural progress has been made. . . . New ways of participa-
tory political action have been promoted: . . . a multistakeholder approach
through the inclusion of all stakeholders, the private sector as well as civil
society is being implemented. This is no small step. . . . Obviously we are still
at the beginning of a very long process . . . M that is,M in the very early stages
of a possible transformation of the UN decision-making procedure, of the
possible development of a new model of global governance which could have
repercussions on national politics.70
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[6.47]The above observation is from the foreword to a set of critical essays by civil
society participants on the first year of the World Summit on the Information
Society. Twelve years on it is still pertinent. This chapter has discussed key
issues for Internet governance, as a contested notion, within this wider histor-
ical context and in the wake of the 2014 NETmundial Outcome Document in
which participating governments and other signatories agreed to a “nonbind-
ing” undertaking to promote a model of Internet governance that “should
promote sustainable and inclusive development and for the promotion of
human rights” and do so in ways that ensure “the full involvement of all
stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities.”71 Whilst the circu-
lar reasoning remains the same, there has been a subtle but concerted shift in
language and emphasis from those of a decade earlier during the WSIS
meetings. Namely, statements that explicitly refer to both “multistakeholder”
and “multilateral” participatory models have made way for those that omit
the latter term altogether.72
[6.48]The first point to make by way of a conclusion is to note that Internet
governance, in form and substance, is political. By this I mean to say that
how the Internet is run, by and for whom, and in which venue according to
which rules of engagement has become an explicitly contested process that is
subject to competing attempts to institutionalize, and thereby legitimate, the
way respective interests wish to ensure “business as usual.” How to reconcile
this push-and-pull between innovative models (of which the IGF is a primary
if much criticized example at the UN, and the recent NETmundial, a proto-
type that has yet to weather its first year) and established ways of doing
things (e.g., at ITU or ICANN meetings) is what lies ahead for the architects
of Internet policy making as a particular sort of model for computer-mediated
global governance.
[6.49]The second point is that many of the major political and sociocultural
issues arising for the future of Internet policy making, as outlined here, are
not new, even if their techno-legal implications may be. They articulate
longstanding bones of contention that are now rendered for the digital, Inter-
net-dependent Zeitgeist, for example, the power ratio between states and
markets (or government regulation versus market-based principles of self-
regulation), private versus public ownership and control of critical resources
such as the Internet’s domain name system, or public service provisions of
access and content in light of corporate power to dominate global market
share, from Microsoft in the 1990s to Google this century. For the Internet,
however defined, is the object of political and economically motivated strug-
gles for control of not only its design, access, and use quite literally but also
the narrative. Internet governance is as much a battle of words as it is a
technological or business decision.73 As an object of analysis and advocacy,
in practical and political terms the Internet is also both the means and the
medium for how governance consultations take place, agendas can be influ-
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enced, and in turn where outcomes are archived and then accessed for future
analysis.
[6.50] This is not to suggest that terms of reference and these larger narratives
are simply semantics. The Internet, as a system combined with the parapher-
nalia of physical cables, gadgets, and communities, is as material a system as
it is one based on “virtual” relationships. Substantive legal and technical
decisions where experts command our attention make a difference to how
people live their lives, polities maintain peace and order (as they see it), and
businesses make money. Nonetheless, the term “the Internet” and its
“governance” are more than descriptive, unproblematic categories. They
have come to encapsulate a cluster of political, economic, and sociocultural
transformations that characterize our times. They are terms deployed by ma-
jor players in the Internet-governance domain, such as ICANN, to conjure up
the inevitable march of progress, for example, a future societal vision of the
Internet as a transformative “tool” to engineer a particular world order. This
epochal role is quite a large burden for an invention that first connected
computers to one another so that computing experts could “talk” to each
other via their consoles, and do so across physical space and different time
zones. It is even quite a lot to carry for its next iteration, as a set of technolo-
gies that enabled ordinary people, nonexperts, to connect with one another,
find information, and get other things done in relatively easy-to-use ways.
Whatever the future may hold, the Internet’s current iteration facilitates an
ever-greater array of computer-dependent tools and applications that now
“infuse our lives. Our homes, our jobs, our social networks—the fundamen-
tal pillars of our existence—now demand immediate access to these technol-
ogies.”74
[6.51] Finally, whilst states are charged with making and enforcing human rights
law, and companies can call upon their proprietary rights as laid down by
intellectual-property guarantees such as copyright, civil society representa-
tives premise their claims on appeals to these laws and norms from a moral
and ethical standpoint. This is to my mind the biggest issue for Internet
governance from an international, or to put in the IG speak of the day,
“global consensus building” perspective. From the point of view of how
ordinary people, communities, and polities may use Internet-dependent
goods and services, in order to survive if not prosper, the ways in which both
states and businesses are seen (not) to carry out their respective responsibil-
ities as “power holders” in their respective “roles and responsibilities to
uphold, protect and respect human rights norms”75 will preoccupy those
working in and researching this domain for some time to come.
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[6.52]NOTES
1. This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Heike Jensen, critical Internet scholar and [6n1]
civil society activist at World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and Internet Govern-
ance Forum (IGF) events, who passed away in 2014. Heike championed both a social construc-
tivist approach to Internet-governance research and work to have women’s human rights be an
integral element in all facets of the Internet’s design, access, and use (Jensen 2005, 2006).
2. At the global level, these events encompass Wikileaks (2010), the Arab Spring [6n2]
(2010–2011), the Occupy Movement and related actions (2012 and ongoing), and the public
furore at news in 2013 that a U.S.-led alliance of Western governments has been engaging in
mass online surveillance at the global level; these are the most prominent cases in point at time
of writing. In terms of where Internet-governance institutions have been evolving, one of these
actors, the Internet Society (2014), has been developing an overview of these various agencies,
now accepted as a reasonable representation of the main actors charged with, or assuming the
leadership in key decisions about, the running of the Internet; see Franklin (2013, 226–27n3)
and Kaspar, Brown, and Varon (2013). For historical accounts, and reflections on UN-hosted
international consultations around global media/Internet policy agendas, see Frau-Meigs et al.
(2012), Gerbner, Mowlana, and Nordenstreng (1993), Hamelink (1998), and MacBride (1980).
3. By this I am referring to the intersection between international human rights law and [6n3]
norms and how the Internet is designed, accessed, and used on the one hand and, on the other,
to where international human rights advocacy communities and Internet policy makers con-
verge.
4. See, for example, Cerf (2012). [6n4]
5. See Council of Europe (2012, 2014a); Jørgensen (2013); Franklin (2013); and UN Frank [6n5]
La Rue Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, para. 60, Human Rights Council, Seventeenth Session, A/
HRC/17/27, May 16, 2011. Standards-setting and treaty-making bodies such as the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) or the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) repre-
sent two distinct sorts of decision-making bodies in this regard. The Internet Governance
Forum (IGF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), and the Council of Europe are in turn another genus of intergovernmental venues,
whilst the nongovernmental, private status of the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) and its pivotal role in how the Internet works or the lobbying and research
of Internet Society (ISoc) is another category again. See note 2 above.
6. Whilst not all elements in the Internet’s history can be claimed as a U.S. invention—the [6n6]
World Wide Web protocols emerged from state-funded research in Europe, for instance, as did
a precursor of the web: Minitel (a French initiative)—today’s dominant tools and applications
(said “social media”) based on the “Web 2.0” design principles and business model (Mandiberg
2012) are predominately United States owned, by private corporations. And to date the main
axis of the Internet’s physical infrastructure and with that the bulk of its packet-switching
traffic still run through the United States itself, passing under U.S. law. The literature on the
skewed physical geography of the Internet and how this has impinged on how it has been
managed to date is diverse. For celebratory accounts of the shift from the World Wide Web
generation of goods and services to the “Web 2.0” social media that dominate today, see
Mandiberg (2012); for an analysis of the history and policy implications of U.S. ownership of
the domain name system, see Mueller (2002) [Au: Please add to refs.]. For a range of views
on the role of the state in running the Internet, see Eriksson and Giacomello (2009) as a
response to Goldsmith and Wu (2006). And for two largely pessimistic views of the Internet’s
democratic potential given the U.S. technical and market dominance, see Morozov (2011) and
Vaidyanathan (2012). And to get an immediate sense of how the Internet as a physical “net-
work of networks” that spans some of the globe more than others, see the range of up-to-date
and historical maps at https://www.telegeography.com/.
7. Evidence that the increase in civil society—and this includes academic—attendees at [6n7]
major events on the Internet-governance (IG) calendar is the result of increased funding can be
gleaned from the rise in civil society attendance at conferences such as those provided by the
Internet Governance Forum, or the European Dialogue on Internet Governance websites. An-
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other indicator is the increase in professional campaigns for ostensibly civil society agendas,,
for example, the 2012 Internet Freedom campaign run by Access Now!, or the Necessary and
Proportionate (2013) campaign on Internet privacy by an alliance of U.S.- and UK-based
NGOs such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation Privacy International, and article 19. Another
indicator in recent years is the formal arrival of large human rights NGOs such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch at the 2014 IGF meeting in Istanbul. Debates as to the
role of not only private sector but also governmental (e.g., the U.S. State Department) funding
of civil society projects, that is, who funds whom and the ensuing agendas that are inferred
from these relationships, are an ongoing source of concern within civil society/academic net-
works active in the IG domain. Journalists and other critics have also been following this
“funding trail.” The financial clout of companies such as Google (a proactive and prominent
funder of research institutes, projects, and events with an Internet-governance theme), the
Disney Corporation (a major funder of the 2015 UNESCO Internet Study Conference), and
ICANN (co-organizer and major funder of the 2014 NETmundial Meeting in Brazil) as they
become more active in supporting major international meetings such as these continues to
exercise scholars and participants. See, for example, Guilhot (2005), Lipschutz (2005), and
Becker and Niggemeier (2012).
[6n8] 8. More on the privileging of the role of governments vis-à-vis that of the private sector or
civil society representation in agenda setting as well as decision making will follow. Suffice it
to say that the research literature is characterized by a wide range of perspectives on just this
point: see, for example, Jørgensen (2006, 2013), Franklin (2010, 2013), Mueller (2010), Dany
(2012), Deibert (2000), Flyverbom (2011), and Singh (2012).
[6n9] 9. Deibert 2015, 15.
[6n10] 10. See Jørgensen (2013) and Council of Europe (2014b).
[6n11] 11. See chapter 3, by Roy Balleste, in this volume.
[6n12] 12. These issues are discussed in Balleste’s chapter 3 and other chapters in this volume.
[6n13] 13. ICANN stands for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a U.S.
nonprofit set up in the late 1990s to oversee the process of assigning Internet addresses and
managing requests and revenues from their corresponding “domain names” (e.g., “.com” or
“.NZ”). The domain name system is what makes the Internet as we know it and with that the
way people navigate the web. See Mueller (2002) and Komaitis (2010) for two authoritative
studies of this organization and its influence.
[6n14] 14. The IGF, for instance, is open to all-comers in that attendance is based on submitting a
form based on self-identified affiliation rather than the need for full accreditation, as is the case
with ITU or UN General Assembly events. That said, ensuring that meetings are considered
suitably representative of all sectors also involves participation by invitation and funding sup-
port (see note 7 above); the 2014 NETmundial Meeting and 2015 UNESCO conference are two
cases in point. See note 40 below.
[6n15] 15. I discuss the limitations of state-centric, technocentric, and media-centric analytical
models more fully in Franklin (2013, 13 passim). For a discussion of how the way a policy is
“framed” plays a formative role in the outcomes of IG decision making and agenda setting, see
Jørgensen (2013). See also the rationale behind the Charter of Human Rights and Principles of
the Internet (IRP Coalition [2011] 2015) and Zalnieriute and Schneider (2014), examples of
two responses to narrowly conceived understandings of Internet-governance priorities devel-
oped from within IGF and ICANN constituencies.
[6n16] 16. UN 2000; ITU/WSIS 2005; Jakubowicz 2009; Healy 2012.
[6n17] 17. Franklin 2004, 2005, 2007, 2013.
[6n18] 18. Global Partners 2013; Mueller 2010; Eriksson and Giacomello 2009.
[6n19] 19. Stalder 2012.
[6n20] 20. An example is the case of how to implement the right to privacy online in technical and
legal terms, that is, encryption software that allows, by default and by law, for an Internet user
to be anonymous when online. The legal and commercial issues that arise for implementing
online anonymity as an operational principle of Internet access and web use (ironically for a
communications system based on open, end-to-end computer communications across a network
as it spans the globe) mean that right, principle, and legal guarantees do not necessarily work
hand in hand. At the operational and international legal level, anonymity being deployed to
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enable people to exercise their right to privacy online in an absolute sense is technically
impossible on the one hand. On the other hand, it is legally and politically complex when
applied across legal jurisdiction for those countries where anonymity is unconstitutional, as is
the case in Brazil.
21. WGIG 2005, 4. [6n21]
22. Elsewhere I explore how the term Internet governmentality, taking a cue from Michel [6n22]
Foucault and others, better encapsulates what is at stake (Franklin 2010, 2013; Lipschutz
2005).
23. Jakubowicz 2009; Mandiberg 2012. [6n23]
24. Benedek and Kettemann 2014; Council of Europe (2014b); MacKinnon et al. 2014. [6n24]
25. Mansell and Silverstone 1996. [6n25]
26. Latour 2007; see also L. Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006), and [6n26]
his arguments about how “code is law.”
27. Quintas 1996. [6n27]
28. Debates about capitalization of the term, aside from different grammatical conventions [6n28]
in different languages or English dialects (e.g., U.S. versus British English spelling), are be-
yond this chapter. Suffice it to say that they do relate to different conceptualizations of the
object of analysis, as a singular or compound noun. For the record, I no longer use capitals
(Franklin 2013) where publishing house styles permit.
29. This is in IGF’s own words but also refers to the WSIS Tunis Agenda (IGF 2008, 2011; [6n29]
ITU/WSIS 2005).
30. For instance, from the ITU hosting of the WSIS process in the first decade of this [6n30]
century to the establishment in 2005 of the UN-based Internet Governance Forum (ITU/WSIS
2005) and its regional spin-off meetings such as the European Dialogue on Internet Governance
(EuroDIG) and the Arab or Latin American Internet Governance Forum meetings, and to the
changing role and ambitions of ICANN as co-instigator of the 2014 NETmundial Meeting in
Brazil (NETmundial 2014) and its mooted successor, the NETmundial Initiative (NMI), to be
based at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. See ITU/WSIS (2003a, b, 2005),
Gerbner, Mowlana, and Nordenstreng (1993), and Frau-Meigs et al. (2012) for more examples
and case studies. For a careful reconstruction of the contentious developments around the
outlook for the form and substance of the 2014 Brazilian NETmundial Meeting as it purported-
ly morphs into a World Economic Forum–sponsored project, see Corwin (2014).
31. This point is referred to in studies such as Benedek and Kettemann (2014) and the [6n31]
Council of Europe (2014b).
32. UN Human Rights Council (2012), A/HRC/RES/20/8. [6n32]
33. Ibid., 2. [6n33]
34. See Vincent (2010, 196) and Clapham (2007, 18–19) on this paradox. [6n34]
35. NETmundial 2014. [6n35]
36. The first is mention of future discussions on “the meaning and application of equal [6n36]
footing” between governments primarily and other protagonists, the private sector, in particular
(NETmundial 2014, 11). The other sticking point, for governmental representatives, is mention
of “mass and arbitrary surveillance” (ibid.) rather than simply “surveillance.” The third conten-
tious point pertains to the insertion of the term “creators” on the same footing as “authors,”
under the rubric of human rights, by including both the “rights of authors and creators as
established in law” (ibid., 4) with respect to freedom of/access to information. Critics and
observers were quick to note the legal and political problems arising from couching copyright
(viz. “intellectual property rights” ) in the same breath as human rights and fundamental
freedoms under international human rights law. Other key points, included as future agenda
points or pending developments, were on how this meeting related to the future of the UN-
hosted Internet Governance Forum and on changes in the ownership and governance structure
of ICANN, the so-called IANA transition (ibid., 10).
37. NETmundial 2014, 4. [6n37]
38. Ibid., 2. [6n38]
39. The document is divided in two parts: “Internet Governance Principles” and “Roadmap [6n39]
for the Future Evolution of the Internet Governance” (NETmundial 2014, 4, 8). Human rights
are framed as underpinning “Internet governance principles” (ibid., 4) in general, albeit fading
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from the explicit text as the document addresses “Internet governance process principles”
(ibid., 6, emphasis added). It is in the latter section and part 2 of the document that we see the
term “multistakeholder” (discussed in the following sections) take over—four times in this one
page. In total this term appears sixteen times in this twelve-page document, in virtually every
major section, including the title. As for “human rights,” this term appears nine times. As key
word “visibility” is a key indicator of success in outcomes that are archived and accessed via
the web’s search engines, and “frequency” becomes a marker of failure or success (see Franklin
2007).
[6n40] 40. NETmundial 2014, 2.
[6n41] 41. Participation in the NETmundial was based on submitting an “expression of interest” in
attending the meeting, from which “invitations” were issued and financial support was offered
(ICANN being a key source of funding and supplier of organizational logistics such as travel
bookings). Observers in the lead-up to the actual meeting noted that it took some time for
governments to indicate their intention to participate. According to the NETmundial website,
“1,480 stakeholders with active voices (including remote participation), from a diversity of 97
nations” took part (NETmundial 2015). Major powers such as the United States, the UK, and
EU leader such as Germany, along with India and China, attended, which indicates a degree of
success. For without governmental support the meeting would have not had the same traction in
terms of its own claims to represent something new. On that point, it bears noting that partici-
pation at IGF meetings has always been open, based on submitting an application form (person-
al information such as passport number, nationality, and contact details). Once approved an
interested party can attend. In short, NETmundial is not the first of its kind in terms of open-
access attendance criteria for nongovernmental participants.
[6n42] 42. The term “cyberspace” evokes the phenomenological, experiential dimensions to what
people do and where people go when “online”; see Franklin (2013, 53–55) for a fuller discus-
sion.
[6n43] 43. In other words, a UN resolution is in itself only a start and for some human rights
specialists a far cry from concrete moves to address pressing points of human rights law as they
apply or not to the online environment, let alone Internet-governance processes. The ongoing
lack of legal remedies that are affordable and accessible for ordinary Internet users who wish to
seek redress from Internet giants such as Google or Facebook, or their own governments,
continues to haunt critical commentaries on the burgeoning number of documents about Inter-
net-governance “principles” (Jørgensen 2013, 61–62, 220 passim; IRP Coalition [2011] 2015).
Court rulings pertaining to human rights online are also emerging as important nodes of debates
amongst policy makers and legal experts (Council of Europe 2014b); my thanks to Joanna
Kulesza for pressing me on this point.
[6n44] 44. Bøås and McNeill 2004.
[6n45] 45. IRP Coalition [2011] 2015, 1.
[6n46] 46. WGIG 2005, 4.
[6n47] 47. The Internet Society (ISoc), for instance, has shifted its stance of late, saying there is
effectively “one single Internet” to promoting the term “the Internet ecosystem.” As for defini-
tions, as ISoc also admits “defining the Internet isn’t easy” (Internet Society 2015, original
emphasis). Hence the WGIG’s optimism in 2005 that defining the Internet is not an issue
continues to be problematic today. Moreover, definitions in this respect have geopolitical
loadings within the UN. Whilst dominant countries such as the United States, the UK, and
western European states tend to echo the sentiments above, other influential UN member states,
China as a prime example but also Brazil and India, maintain that there is a distinction between
a U.S.-centric “global” Internet, nation-based infrastructures with respective terms of access
and use, and content regulation. Since the Snowden revelations, dominant EU states such as
Germany have also shifted their view that a U.S.-centric infrastructure is appropriate given the
jurisdictional power that accrues to the United States by having most of the world’s Internet
traffic pass over U.S. territory. In short, definitions as well as operations are now increasingly
politicized even if they have always been political (Mansell and Silverstone 2006[Au: Please
add to refs.]; Franklin 2013). If, as one of the core definitions of the Internet maintains, the
term “Internet” refers to a “network of networks,” then the notion of the Internet in the singular
flies in the face of its multiplex historical and techno-economic trajectory to date.
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48. ITU/WSIS 2005, para. 72 and 73, emphasis added. [6n48]
49. The NETmundial Outcome Document (2014) discussed above is one. See Bellamy and [6n49]
McChesney (2011), Mueller (2010), and Singh (2012) for different views on this matter.
50. IGF 2008. [6n50]
51. UN General Assemble 2000, target 8f. [6n51]
52. NETmundial 2014, 4, 7. [6n52]
53. Gurumurthy and Singh 2012; Jørgensen 2006; Jensen 2006. [6n53]
54. For example, IRP Coalition [2011] 2015; Necessary and Proportionate 2013; and Coun- [6n54]
cil of Europe 2014a, 2014b.
55. Franklin 2013, 190 passim. [6n55]
56. See Franklin (2013, 138–39). As to the origins and locus of Internet governance that [6n56]
predates UN involvement in this domain, these decisions date from the emergence of the
Internet itself strictly speaking, that is, interoperable computer networks require agreements,
and those agreements translate into code, Internet protocols being the basic building block to
the Internet’s supporting architecture (Mueller 2002). Internet-governance scholars and respec-
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